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Abstract
In auctions where bidders are uncertain of their value and are fully
liable for their bids, there exists the potential for losses if bids exceed
realized values. Theoretically, bids will be higher if bidders are able to
mitigate this downside loss through some form of limited liability. To
determine the impact of di¤ering forms of limited liability, this paper the-
oretically and experimentally examines a second price auction with uncer-
tain private values in three environments: market-based limited liability,
statutory limited liability, and full liability. Market-based limited liability
is induced through inter-bidder resale following the auction. Statutory
limited liability is created through a default penalty option in the event
that a bidder would make a loss. Bids are theoretically shown to be higher
under resale and the penalty default environments than under full liabil-
ity. The experimental results conrm more aggressive bidding for resale
and the low penalty default treatments, but not by as much as theory
predicts. Notably, under the high default penalty bidders are not bid-
ding signicantly more than under full liability, despite the theoretical
prediction that they should.
JEL Codes: D44 C90
Key Words: Auctions, Limited Liability, Resale, Experimental Eco-
nomics
1 Introduction
Countless economic transactions, from housing sales and Ebay transactions to
government procurement auctions, involve uncertainty and risk. Economic in-
tuition would suggest that when individuals are facing a situation where risk is
involved, they would be more willing to engage in risky choices if they are not
fully liable for their choice in the event of a bad outcome. We may expect to
Department of Economics, Florida State University, 113 Collegiate Loop, PO Box
3062180, Tallahassee, FL, 32306-2180, kkj8919@fsu.edu.
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see di¤erences in the amount of risk an individual is willing accept, theoretically
and behaviorally, depending on the level and form of liability rules.
All economic transactions where uncertainty and risk are involved must have
some liability institution in place.1 As an example, the recent surge in press
coverage regarding the housing bubble and subsequent rise of foreclosures has
highlighted the various liability settings available to homeowners. In addition
to the popular press, important questions have developed in the academic lit-
erature, such as how are homeowners responding to the default options and
various liability settings? This question was recently addressed by Ghent &
Kudlyak (2009) who found an increase in the probability of default for states
where lenders have recourse rights versus non-recourse states. While Ghent
& Kudlyak provide important insights into the choice of default, an important
question remains - if the loss can be mitigated in the future, does this factor into
their initial bids? This paper will address this question in an auction setting
with uncertain private values. Three primary liability types will be theoretically
analyzed and implemented in a laboratory experiment to ascertain how bidding
behavior di¤ers across these liability rules.
In real markets there are a variety of forms of liability. The standard is,
of course, full liability in which an agent is fully responsible for the entirety
of any loss that he incurs. There are also a variety of bankruptcy rules, and
other governmental policies, which can limit how much of a loss for which an
individual or rm is liable. We will refer to this class of limited liability rules as
statutory limited liability as these rules will typically be specied in the rules of
any particular market or the relevant part of bankruptcy code. For simplicity
in this context, we will assume this takes the form of an agent having to pay
some fraction of the total price of the item promised in payment and having the
agent forfeit the item. Depending on that fraction and the amount of the loss,
though, the agent may not be best o¤ by choosing to default this way and may
prefer to keep the item su¤ering a small loss.
There is another form of limited liability that is perhaps not always thought
of as a way of achieving limited liability, and that is the opportunity to resell an
item. If an agent buys an item and realizes he overpaid relative to his value for
the item, he may be able to nd someone else to purchase the item from him
and possibility limit the degree of loss or even potentially make a prot on the
transaction. While resale opportunities may not always be thought of as a form
of limited liability, it is an important form of it which should be examined. The
main purpose of this paper is to examine how individuals, when confronted with
uncertainty and risk, react to market-based limited liability induced through
a secondary resale market and statutory limited liability compared to a full
liability baseline. It is highly likely that while limited liability may lead to more
aggressive behavior, statutory liability may lead to more aggressive behavior
than market-based resale liability because of the subtle nature of resale. All
limited liability forms are contrasted against full liability to determine if bidding
1Even the lack of a statutory liability rule, still constitutes a liability institution - likely
full liability.
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behavior does indeed become more aggressive.
To accomplish this, a second price auction is utilized where bidding takes
place for the opportunity to play a lottery. This analysis examines how outcomes
di¤er under varying liability rules. The baseline of analysis begins with the
full liability scenario, where bidders are responsible for all losses. This is then
extended to statutory and market-based limited liability scenarios. Statutory
limited liability is created through default options, while market-based limited
liability is shown to emerge from a post-auction resale opportunity.
The second price auction used in this paper is a modied version of the stan-
dard second price auction. This particular variant of the second price auction
has a bid clock for withdrawal. The bid clock is typically used in the ascending
auction, where the drop out bids are common knowledge. To maintain the sec-
ond price format, the bids are not made public, but the clock is still used for
withdrawal.2 The dominant strategy in a standard second price or ascending
auction is that all bidders bid their value. The inclusion of the clock is based
on previous experimental results where over-bidding has been observed in sec-
ond price auctions without the clock versus equilibrium bidding in an ascending
auction. Adding the clock appears to reduce bidding mistakes, so di¤erences
in the observed bids for the current design can be attributed to changes in the
bidding environment.3
An auction for a lottery is analogous to the situation where a bidder is
bidding on an item of uncertain quality. After the auction this uncertainty is
resolved and if the high state occurs, the value is high. If the low state occurs,
the value is low. For example, in the recycling industry surplus manufacturing
materials are often sold via auction. After the auction, it is sometimes revealed
that the material purchased is no longer useful to the auction winner. This
is a well-suited example for the particular theoretical environment created in
this paper. The material either has value for the winner, or it does not. The
information is revealed after the auction has taken place. The use of a lottery
mimics this real world example of good and bad states.
How a bidder would choose to bid under uncertainty depends critically on
the liability rules. In the above recycling example, if a bidder knew that default
was an option, and not too costly, they would be more likely to bid aggressively.
How the auctioneer sets up the default rules would determine how the bidder
would bid. Alternatively, if the auctioneer set full liability as the statutory rule,
limited liability is still possible. After the auction, the uncertainty is resolved.
The winning bidder could resell the item won to another bidder if it were revealed
2A second price auction with a clock begins at a price of zero, which gradually ticks up,
based on the clock increment. A bidder chooses to drop out of the auction when the clock
has reached the maximum amount that they are willing to pay for the lottery chance. The
particular variant of the auction used for this paper is sealed, in that bidders are unaware
of the other bids placed and the auction ends when all bids have been placed. The winning
bidder pays a price equal to the second highest bid. The mechanism examined in this paper
only has two bidders, so the information revelation is equivalent between the open ascending
auction and this sealed version.
3See Kagel et al. (1987) for previous experimental results on ascending auctions and Cooper
& Fang (2008) for results on second price auctions.
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that they had a higher value for the item than the winning bidder. In this sense,
the secondary market creates a situation of limited liability without the rule
having been directly established.
When the auctioneer sets up the default rules, they must consider carefully
how the bidder would respond. It is likely that if a bidder is facing limited liabil-
ity instead of full liability, they would bid more aggressively. While intuitively
it appears that more aggressive bidding would lead to higher revenue, this is not
necessarily the case under limited liability. If limited liability takes the form of
a default option (statutory), then this could potentially lower revenue as higher
bids lead to a higher probability of default. Limited liability induced through a
secondary resale market is, on the other hand, a very attractive outcome for the
seller. Assume that the auction has a full liability rule for the winner, but also
the possibility of resale. If bidders understand the resale market, and transfer
the limited liability aspects of this market into higher bids, the seller will ben-
et. The aggressive bids raise revenue, and since default is not an option, the
seller reaps all additional revenue.
A number of theoretical papers have addressed the issues of default and
limited liability. Zheng (2001) focused on budget constraints including the pos-
sibility of default, and theoretically showed that low-budget bidders, given bank-
ruptcy options, will bid more aggressively and declare bankruptcy with higher
probability. Waehrer (1995) has a set-up similar to the construction analyzed
in this paper examining exogenous statutory liability rules. In Waehrer, the
default penalty takes the form of a deposit that is lost in the event of bank-
rupt bidders. Waehrer nds that bids become more aggressive as the deposit
decreases. Board (2007) adds to the literature by examining default across mul-
tiple auction types and also adds insight into the perspective of the seller in the
presence of defaulting bidders and various recovery scenarios.
This paper focuses on the bidding behavior, and analyzes revenue, but does
not vary the sellers recovery options. The item is fully recovered in the event of
default. Board examines the possibility of resale as one of the recovery options.
This paper also looks at resale, but assumes that it is not the seller reselling,
but the winning bidder who has just participated in a full liability auction. The
secondary resale market creates market-based limited liability that does not
statutorily exist in the auction.
Other experimental papers have addressed the possibility of default and lim-
ited liability, in a di¤erent sense. Limited liability created by budget constraints
was examined by Hasen & Lott (1991) in a comment regarding the design of
Kagel & Levin (1986). A typical constraint faced in economic experiments, and
the issue raised by Hasen & Lott, is that subjects cannot make losses. There-
fore, subjects with low cash balances have limited liability because the downside
loss is capped at zero. Kagel & Levin (1991) respond to this comment with how
they controlled for limited liability by providing cash endowments to the sub-
jects that covered the maximum possible loss. They also note the importance
of not overlooking the potential e¤ects of limited liability on bidding. Bud-
get constraints can also be viewed as a form of market-based limited liability,
but this type of liability is not examined in this paper and is di¤erent from
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market-based limited liability from resale that mitigates losses. Roelofs (2002)
theoretically and experimentally examines a common value procurement auc-
tion with default. He nds evidence that bidders do bid more aggressively when
default is allowed, as predicted, but this does not necessarily help the auction-
eers revenue, citing the winners curse as a possible explanation. The approach
used in this paper di¤ers in the form of auction and extends the analysis from
full default/full liability to limited liability/full liability.
To my knowledge, a unique contribution of this paper is the experimental
test of resale as a form of market-based limited liability from the perspective
of the bidder. Pagnozzi (2007) theoretically examines resale with strong and
weak bidders, where the weak bidder enjoys limited liability due to a low initial
wealth. The possibility of inter-bidder resale between the strong and weak
bidder leads to more aggressive bidding by the limited liability weak bidder. The
strong bidder, who does not enjoy limited liability, waits for resale to purchase
the item. This paper di¤ers from Pagnozzi in that all bidders have the same
value distributions and wealth distribution. The resale possibility creates limited
liability, not di¤ering wealth constraints. Haile (2003) theoretically deals with
uncertain values and resale opportunities, but the focus of Haile is not on the
market-based limited liability aspects of resale.
The remaining sections of this paper include theoretical and behavioral pre-
dictions in section 2. The experimental design is discussed in section 3 with an
analysis of the results in section 4. Section 5 concludes, including a discussion
of the steps that can be taken to move forward.
2 Theory and Behavioral Predictions
2.1 Theoretical Predictions
In this section, I solve for the symmetric equilibrium bid strategies under lim-
ited liability induced through resale, statutory measures, and full liability. The
model assumes a second price auction for a lottery with two risk neutral bidders.
Each lottery consists of an upper and lower bound. The probability that the
upper or lower bound from the lottery becomes the realized value is assumed
to be .5. The lower bound, x, is drawn from the uniform distribution on the
support [0; 1]. The upper bound of the lottery is equal to x + y, where 0 < y
< 1: The uncertainty is resolved immediately following the auction, when the
lottery is played. The resulting realized value is denoted as v.
In the full liability case, neither the default option nor the resale option is
available to the bidders. At the conclusion of the auction, all bidders realize
their particular value that results from the 50/50 lottery. The winning bidder
earns the di¤erence between their realized value and the price that resulted from
the lottery, with full liability in the event of a loss.
Statutory limited liability takes the form of a default option where the win-
ning bidder pays a penalty cost in the event the bidder chooses to default. The
penalty cost is equal to a percentage, ; of the price that results from the auc-
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tion. All bidders are aware of the structure of default prior to the start of the
auction.
Market-based limited liability is analyzed through a secondary resale market
that occurs at the end of the auction. The resale transactions are assumed to
only take place between the bidders that originally participated in the auction.4
At the conclusion of the auction, all realized values become common knowledge
for all bidders. The winner of the auction resells at a price equal to the highest
value in the group of bidders.
While it is reasonable to assume that the resale price agreed upon in practice
might exist below the value of the nal buyer, this analysis is more focused on
the limited liability aspects of resale, without the additional complication of
alternative specications of bargaining power over the nal allocation. In this
set-up, the reseller is assumed to have all of the bargaining power in resale.
Noting this, under an alternative bargaining scheme the winning bidder would
never resell for a price less than their realized value, therefore the nal resale
price must exist between the realized value of the winner and the realized value
of the losing bidder. The limited liability aspects of resale would still hold with
an alternative mix of bargaining power.
Construction of the bid functions involves assuming that the bid function is
monotonically increasing and di¤erentiable, then verifying that it is monotonic
and di¤erentiable. The remainder of this theoretical portion will solve for the
symmetric equilibrium bid strategies under full liability rst and then the statu-
tory and market-based resale forms of limited liability.5
2.1.1 Full Liability
The lower bound of the lottery for bidder i is represented as xi: Assume through-
out that bid functions are symmetric, that is b(xi) = bj(xj); for all i and j.
Assume all bidders, except i, bid using b(xj): The construction is designed to
see how bidder i responds to b(xj); by allowing bidder i to choose to bid ac-
cording to some other lower bound, r, which isnt necessarily his: Bidder i will
win if b(r) > b(xj);which occurs with probability F (r). The lower bound of
the lottery, x, occurs with probability 12 . The upper bound of the lottery, equal
to x + y, where y < 1; correspondingly also occurs with probability 12 . The
parameter value, y; is known and common to all bidders. The realized value for
bidder i is represented as vi:
The second price auction problem is therefore dened as follows under the
full liability case for bidder i:
max
r
Ui(vi; r) =
R r
0

1
2 (vi   bj(t)) + 12 (vi + y   bj(t))

dF (t) (1)
4 Inter-bidder resale is a limiting case of market-based limited liability where bidders can
resell to others in the event of a possible loss. This analysis is restricted to inter-bidder resale
to facilitate the experimental design. However, while not in the scope of this paper, limited
liability would generally hold if the resale market was extended to potential buyers who did
not participate in the auction.
5All asserted bid functions are explained in the appendix.
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With the equilibrium condition
@(Ui(vi;r))
@r jr=vi = 0 (2)
The full liability (FL) bidding solution can be shown to be:
bFL(vi) = vi +
1
2y (3)
So, the equilibrium is to bid the expected value of the lottery.
2.1.2 Market-based Limited Liability through Resale
The assumptions made in the full liability case remain in the resale case. The
important change in this model is that inter-bidder resale is now allowed. At
the conclusion of the auction, the winning bidder has the option of reselling to
the losing bidder, if the realized value of the losing bidder is higher than the
realized value of the winning bidder.6 The losing bidder is sold to at a price
equal to his realized value. All realized values are common knowledge at the
conclusion of the auction. The equilibrium bid function is derived below.
As in the full liability case, the second price auction problem is dened as
follows under the market based resale liability for bidder i:
max
r
Ui(vi; r) =
Z r y
0

1
2
(vi   bj(t)) + 1
2
(vi + y   bj(t))

dF (t) +Z r
r y
[
1
2
f1
2
(vi   bj(t)) + 1
2
(t+ y   bj(t))g+
1
2
fvi + y   bj(t)g]dF (t) +
Z 1
r
0  d[1  F (t)]
(4)
With the equilibrium condition
@(Ui(vi;r))
@r jr=vi = 0 (5)
The resale liability (RL) bidding solution can be shown to be:
bRL(v) = v +
3
4y (6)
6By construction, the equilibrium bid function is assumed to be increasing in the lower
bound of the lottery. Additionally, the entire resale surplus is earned by the winning bidder.
Therefore, bidders do not engage in strategic demand reduction. The resale option acts
strictly as a limited liability option in the event that winning bidders realized value is equal
to their lower bound from the lottery, vi = xi; and is lower than the realized value of the
losing bidder - which occurs when this bidders realized value is vj = xj + y:
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The rst term in the equation represents what the bidder will earn when
he wins the auction and keeps the item. The second term represents what the
bidder will earn if he wins the auction and keeps the item, or wins the auction
and resells. The last term represents the earnings if bidder i loses the auction,
and purchases the item in resale. At the conclusion of the auction, all realized
values become common knowledge across bidders, and the losing bidder is resold
to at a price equal to their realized value. Therefore this last term represents
zero potential earnings from buying in the resale market.
The exposition of bid functions for the full liability and resale market based
liability cases leads to the rst theoretical claim.
Claim 1 Under a uniform distribution, market-based limited liability theoreti-
cally leads to more aggressive bidding, for all potential values, than what would
result if bidders were not allowed to resell under full liability.
The following subsection examines a limited liability scenario that is estab-
lished through default rules in the auction. The above claim does not always
hold for statutory liability.
2.1.3 Statutory Limited Liability
All general assumptions, not specic to resale, again hold for the statutory
liability case. The key change from the full liability scenario is that now bidders
are allowed to default. Additionally, it should be noted that resale possibilities
are not included in this model. The specic default rule used in this model
is if the winning bidder opts to default, they must pay a penalty percentage,
0    1; of the price that results from the auction.
A winning bidder would only choose to default, and not receive the value
of the lottery, if the loss from default is less than the loss su¤ered under the
auction. Therefore, if bidder i chooses to default, he would pay a default cost
equal to  bj : The range of  determines the extreme scenarios, one of which
is the full liability case solved above where  = 1: Likewise, if  = 0; the bidder
is not responsible for any losses and corresponds to full default (no liability).
A bidder will choose to default if the losses associated with default,  bj ;
are less than the payo¤ from receiving the realized value from the lottery and
paying the price that results from the auction, otherwise the bidder will accept
the realized value. Therefore, the payo¤ resulting to the winning bidder in this
second price auction set-up is dened as follows, under statutory default penalty
rule for bidder i:
Ui(vi; bj ; ) =
1
2 max fvi   bj;   bjg+ 12 max fvi + y   bj;   bjg (7)
A bidder choosing to default depends critically on the statutory choice of .
As the default penalty increases, the cost associated with default approaches
full liability and therefore bidders are less likely to choose default as an option -
behaving as if the default option does not exist. This can be seen formally, in the
limit as  approaches 1, the problem reduces to the full liability problem as the
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bidder would never choose to default for values greater than 0. For values equal
to zero, the bidder is indi¤erent between default and no default, therefore it is
assumed they will choose to not default.7 As the default penalty decreases, the
cost associated with default goes to zero, and bidders will default with higher
frequency.
Choices of  that are above the full default case but less than the full liability
case result in a cuto¤ value, vc. This cuto¤ value kinks the equilibrium bid
function. The intuition behind this cuto¤ value is that above some value, the
cuto¤ value, the default cost is too high and they would never default. They
then treat the auction with default as if it were an auction without the default
possibility.
vi
1  > bj (8)
A bidder does not default as long as the payo¤ from the auction is greater
than the penalty associated with default. This condition is seen in equation 8.
For the second price auction with stated rules, the symmetric statutory
liability (SL) bidding solution can be shown to be:
bSL(vi) =

1
1+ (v + y) if v  vc
v + 12y if v > vc
(9)
The bid function is equivalent to the full liability bid function for values
above the cuto¤ value, vc. For values below the cuto¤ value, the bidder is
choosing to bid a percentage of the highest possible realized value. Notice also
that if the default penalty  is low enough, the bidder would always choose to
bid taking advantage of the default rule. Recall, the highest realized value that
a bidder can achieve is v + y: Therefore, if a bidder was able to fully default,
 = 0; they would be willing to bid up to their highest possible value.
This analysis leads to the second theoretical claim.
Claim 2 Under a uniform distribution, statutory limited liability theoretically
leads to more aggressive bidding, for the subset of values that lie below the cuto¤
value, vc, than what would result if bidders were not allowed to resell and faced
full liability For values above the cuto¤ value, the bids under statutory limited
liability and full liability without resale are equivalent.
2.1.4 Revenue
Market-based limited liability leads to more aggressive bidding for all values over
full liability. This aggressive bidding leads to higher revenue for the auctioneer,
provided the opportunity for resale in the secondary market exists. This result
holds assuming that the possibility of default is not allowed.
7See appendix for details when  = 1
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Claim 3 Under a uniform distribution, market-based limited liability theoret-
ically leads to more aggressive bidding which results in higher revenue for the
auctioneer than what would result if bidders were not allowed to resell under full
liability.
Without considering the probability of default, statutory limited liability
leads to higher gross revenue through more aggressive bidding. The possibility
of default under statutory limited liability does not have as clearly cut revenue
predictions as the resale and full liability cases. Under statutory liability, the
expectation of revenue depends on the highest and second highest lower bound
draws, the spread between upper and lower bounds, and the default penalty.
Given the sensitivity of revenue to the parameter set-up, the theoretical claims
for revenue in the statutory default treatments are directly calculated for com-
parison in the results section.
2.2 Behavioral Predictions
The two key treatments involve varying the types of limited liability that the
auction participants face. Behaviorally, the framing of the liability rules, market-
based versus statutory, may lead to a di¤ering mix of behaviors from the specic
theoretical predictions made.
2.2.1 Market-based resale liability
Under market-based liability, the bidders are facing a secondary market. Prior
evidence from ascending auctions with inter-bidder resale markets, reported in
Saral (2009), has shown that when bidders face a secondary resale market where
the reseller earns the majority of the surplus, bidders engage in speculative
behavior by bidding above their value.
Speculation is not modeled specically in the model above, as bidders never
bid above the highest possible value in the lottery. However, it may be the case
that bidders, in particular bidders with values that are on the lower end of the
distribution, may choose to speculate by bidding above their highest possible
value with the hopes of reselling.
Claim 4 The presence of an inter-bidder resale market may lead to speculation
where bidders choose to bid above the high bound of the lottery to resell to the
losing bidder. This behavior is more likely when a bidders lower bound is on
the lower end of the distribution.
This behavioral prediction, while valid, is likely muted in this environment
by two factors. First, the bidders are facing a more complex environment with
uncertainty. Second, bidding groups only involve two bidders. Speculation in
this environment carries a higher risk of loss than a similar environment with
more bidders. Behaviorally, we would expect bidders with a higher risk tolerance
to engage in more frequently in speculation. If bidders engage in speculative
behavior, we should expect revenue to increase with the increase in bids, over
what would be expected without speculation.
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2.2.2 Statutory liability
All theoretical models considered above assumed that bidders are risk neutral.
It is highly likely that the risk attitudes of the subjects will vary. Katok and
Salmon (2009), in a similar set-up, nd that bidding behavior under uncer-
tainty varies widely from the risk neutral prediction. Many bidders bid below
the risk neutral prediction, indicating some form of risk or loss aversion. It is
expected that these behavioral di¤erences will impact all treatments, including
the baseline full liability.
Claim 5 Heterogeneity in risk attitudes is likely to be observed through changes
in bidding behavior from the risk neutral prediction. Across bidders, those in-
dividuals who exhibit higher levels of risk tolerance should bid higher than indi-
viduals with lower risk tolerance, in all treatments.
For the individual bidder, the prediction that statutory limited liability
should increase bids is valid, but depends on the level of the default penalty
cost, . Bidders may respond di¤erently to varying levels of the default, de-
pending on their tolerance for loss and/or risk aversion. Behaviorally, we might
expect that at higher levels of the default cost, some bidders may respond by
bidding as if the default option does not exist, despite theoretical predictions
that they should bid higher.
3 Design of Experiments
The experiment was designed to analyze bidding behavior in a second price clock
auction with uncertain values, under three limited liability scenarios. Two of
the three limited liability environments are statutory in nature, where bidders
have a default option available that imposes a default penalty if the penalty is
less than the full liability payment. The second limited liability environment is
market-based limited liability induced through a resale opportunity.
A primary goal of this design was to observe how bidding behavior changes
between the baseline environment with full liability to one with limited liabil-
ity. A secondary goal was to compare behavioral di¤erences in statutory and
market-based liability. To accomplish these goals, three symmetric treatments
of a second price clock auction were created. The baseline treatment was the
full liability environment and using a within-subjects design, subjects also par-
ticipated in one of the three limited liability treatments. A between-subjects
design is used for comparisons across the limited liability treatments. The spe-
cic procedures are as follows:
Undergraduate students were recruited and brought into the laboratory at
Florida State University where they participated in a series of second price clock
auctions. A total of 96 subjects participated. Sixteen subjects participated in
each of the 6 sessions run. In each session, the 16 subjects were randomly
divided into two groups of 8.
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Treatment Sessions # Subjects
Full Liability / Resale 2 32
Full Liability / 5% Default Liability 2 32
Full Liability / 25% Default Liability 2 32
Table 1: Experimental Sessions
The experiment was programmed using Z-tree software, Fischbacher (2007).
Subjects were given instructions and run through the Holt & Laury (HL) (2002)
risk tolerance procedure. One of the choices from the HL procedure was ran-
domly chosen for payment. The second phase of the experiment consisted of
30 paid auction rounds. The rst ten auction rounds had the subjects partici-
pate in the full liability baseline followed by one of the liability treatments, split
equally between the 10 periods.
Prior to these rounds, subjects were given auction instructions for the full
liability treatment only. These instructions included an example of bidding be-
havior, and the opportunity to participate in one unpaid practice period against
a computerized bidder (robot), prior to the start of the paid periods. After the
instructions and practice period, the subjects entered into the 5 paid rounds of
the baseline treatment. Following the rst ve baseline periods, subjects were
given new instructions for the particular limited liability treatment they were
participating in.
Following the form of the baseline instruction, the subjects were given new
instructions regarding the change in liability rules. These instructions again
included an example of bidding behavior and an unpaid practice round against
a robot. Upon conclusion of this second set of instructions, the subjects then
participated in 5 paid auction rounds of the liability treatment.
The last twenty rounds of auctions were separated into 10 baseline rounds
followed by 10 treatment rounds. In each auction round, the participants were
rematched with a new partner within their initial group of 8. The subjects
did not know they were randomly grouped into a group of 8, they were only
informed that they would be randomly matched with a di¤erent subject in each
round. The subjects were always notied on screen about the rule changes, and
through verbal announcement. Tables 1 and 2 outline the experimental session
and round structure.
In each period, subjects randomly drew their lower bound, x; for the lottery
from a uniform distribution on the range [0,50]. The upper bound of the lottery
was always equal to x + 20: The maximum bid allowed was 70 units, which is
the maximum realized value the lottery could take. They participated in the
auction through a computer interface, where they were able to see a bid clock
gradually increasing from 0 in increments of 1.8 The subjects chose to drop
outwhen the bid clock reached a price they were no longer willing to pay. This
auction was sealed, meaning the subjects would see the clock but they did not
8Display screenshots can be found in the Appendix.
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Auction Round Treatment
Rounds 1-5 Full Liability Baseline
Rounds 6-10 Limited Liability Treatment
Rounds 11-20 Full Liability Baseline
Rounds 21-30 Limited Liability Treatment
Table 2: Treatments by Auction Rounds
see when the opposing bidder dropped out.
The auction ended when all bids had been placed, or when the bid clock
hit 70. The winner of the auction was the subject with the highest bid and
any ties were broken randomly by the computer program. At the conclusion of
the auction, the outcome of the lottery was determined and the liability rule in
e¤ect would automatically be implemented in the event of a loss.
The theoretical bid functions are constructed assuming that bidders will
choose the default option if it is the loss minimizing choice. This experimental
design is structured to test the bidding predictions, so automatic default was
chosen in line with the theory. The resale market was also automatically im-
plemented. This was done to avoid bargaining between the winning and losing
bidder. The theory assumes that the winner of the auction resells to the losing
bidder at a price equal to their realized value, and automatic resale enforces this
rule to clearly identify from the design if bidders are able to implement resale
as limited liability.
The baseline and three treatments are summarily dened as follows:
Full Liability (Baseline) Treatment: The winner is fully liable for all losses
in the event that earnings are negative.
Resale Treatment: In the event that the losing bidder has a higher realized
value from the lottery than the winner, the winner automatically resells to the
losing bidder at a price equal to the value of the winning bidder.
5% Liability Treatment: In the event that the winning bidder would make
a loss, the bidder automatically defaults (if the loss is less under default) and
pays a default cost equal to 5% of the losing bid.
25% Liability Treatment: In the event that the winning bidder would make
a loss, the bidder automatically defaults (if the loss is less under default) and
pays a default cost equal to 25% of the losing bid.
In each session, the subjectsearnings were denominated in experimental
currency units (ECUs). These were exchanged into dollars at a rate of $0.04 per
ECU. Subjects were given 150 ECUs as an endowment that losses and prots
were added to as the experiment progressed. The earnings from the Holt Laury
procedure in stage 1 were not included in this endowment. The endowment was
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given to avoid biased bidding behavior for people close to bankruptcy. Sub-
jects only participated in one session. Average earnings of the subjects were
$28.16, including the show-up fee of $10 and Holt Laury earnings, with zero
bankruptcies.
4 Results
Initially, I will discuss the impact of the various limited liability treatments on
bidding behavior, using the full liability case as the baseline treatment. Revenue
and e¢ ciency results will be examined in the nal sections. The rst 5 periods
of each treatment served primarily as a learning phase and were included so
that the subjects would familiarize themselves with the auction format and the
particular liability rule in place. The analysis that follows, unless explicitly
stated, will use the data from the last 10 rounds of auctions that remained after
the training phases.
4.1 Bidding behavior
Figure 1 charts out the observed bids against the lower bound draws. Included
in each graph are 45 degree lines for where the bid would equal the lower bound
and where the bid would equal the corresponding upper bound, regression lines,
and theoretical predictions.9
The rst theoretical claim proposed that bids would be higher under market-
based resale limited liability than under full liability. The second theoretical
claim stated that depending on the default penalty cost, ; bidding would be
more aggressive in the lower range of values up to the cuto¤ and equal to full
liability after the cuto¤. From the regression and theoretical prediction lines, it
is evident that when bidders have limited liability through a resale opportunity
or with a low default cost, they are choosing to bid higher. It also appears
that under a higher default cost of 25%, bidders are not bidding as high as
predicted. Note that in the 25% default treatment, bids should theoretically be
equivalent to the full liability bids after the cuto¤ of 30. Prior to this cuto¤, bids
should be higher under the 25% default rule. Interestingly, under full default, the
regression indicates that bidders are choosing to bid higher than the prediction.
Regardless of the treatment imposed, the theoretical bid functions predicted
bids between the upper and lower bounds of the lottery. It is evident from the
four gures that in all treatments some bidders are choosing to bid above the
upper bound of the lottery.
In the resale treatment this bidding behavior might be explained as spec-
ulation. However, because speculation can only occur in an auction where a
secondary market exists, the presence of overbidding in the statutory liability
treatments and full liability treatments dilutes the speculation hypothesis, and
leaves open the question of why overbidding exists across all treatments.
9The lower 45 degree line is where bid equals the fundamental value, x. The upper line
graphs where bid equals the upper lottery draw, x+ 20:
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Full Liability Resale Liability
5% Default 25% Default Bids
Figure 1: Observed Bids, Theoretical prediction (solid line), and Regression
(dashed line)
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The observed overbidding in all treatments, including the baseline, is similar
to the bidding behavior that has been observed in multiple experiments for
standard sealed-bid second price auctions, where bidders bid above their value,
except here they are bidding above the upper bound of the lottery.10
Overbidding in the second price format was described by Kagel, Harstad,
and Levin (1987) to be a result of the illusion that it improves the probability
of winning with no real cost to the bidder as the second-high-bid price is paid.
Examples of over-bidding in a standard second price auction are also seen in
Cooper & Hang (2008), who nd evidence that bidders are less likely to overbid
when their perception of the opponents value is close to their own value. This
result helps explain the overbidding, as the experimental design consisted of two-
bidder groups. With a larger number of bidders, the overbidding would likely
not have been as pronounced due to the higher probability that a competing
bidders lower bound was closer to their lower bound. Note that the observed
overbidding should be di¤erentiated from overbidding in auctions that are not
second price, particularly the rst price auction, where overbidding has been
attributed to risk aversion, starting with Cox, Smith & Walker (1988).
Bidders are also bidding below the lower bound of the lottery. While under-
bidding is not as pronounced as overbidding, it also exists across all treatments.
This result of bidders choosing to bid below the fundamental value, was also
observed by Katok and Salmon (2009) in a similar experimental design with full
liability.
While bids do lie beyond the upper and lower bounds of the lottery, the
number of bids outside of these bounds does not appear large when exam-
ined in relative terms against the total number of bids. Table 3, examines the
percentage of under and over-bids in the treatments. The percentage of bids
represented in table 3 matches the gures in the column listed Last 10. The
remaining columns give the percentages for all 15 periods of auctions, and for
the rst 5 periods for comparison.
From table 3, it is seen that the overall percentage of bids that lie below the
bounds of the lottery are decreasing. The rst auctions that all subjects partic-
ipated in were full liability for 5 periods. A high percentage of individuals are
underbidding, while a modest percentage are overbidding. It appears that there
is a treatment impact. This is especially evident in the observed percentage of
overbidding. Increases in the percentage of overbidding occur in the 5% default
and full liability treatments. Overbidding in the 5% default treatment is the
highest, relative to all other treatments. The cost associated with overbidding
in this treatment is quite low, so this result is not surprising.
The observed increase in overbidding for the full liability treatment is more
surprising. The last 10 periods of the full liability treatment were played after
the rst 5 periods of the particular limited liability treatment that a subject
was in. The limited liability treatment appears to be driving the results behind
the full liability treatment. For the subjects that participated in the 5% default
10Under and over-bidding is in reference to the upper and lower bounds of the lottery,
respectively.
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treatment, overbidding in the subsequent full liability rounds occurred 9.06%
of the time. The full liability percentages, after subjects had participated in 5
periods of the resale or 25% default sessions, were 6.56% and 5.31% respectively.
The particular liability treatment had an impact on the bidding behavior ob-
served under full liability, as more aggressive bidding from the treatment carried
over into the full liability baseline.
Underbidding All Periods First 5 Last 10
Full Liability - Baseline 6.39% 12.50% 3.34%
Resale Liability 3.23% 5.31% 2.19%
5% Default Liability 2.40% 5.31% 0.94%
25% Default Liability 6.46% 10.63% 4.38%
Overbidding All Periods First 5 Last 10
Full Liability - Baseline 5.52% 2.60% 6.98%
Resale Liability 9.48% 9.69% 9.38%
5% Default Liability 10.73% 5.00% 13.59%
25% Default Liability 6.46% 7.19% 6.09%
Table 3: The percentage of bids below and above the fundamental value.
The theoretical bids are compared against the observed bids, averaged across
sessions for the last ten rounds, in Table 4. Under full liability, bidders are bid-
ding higher than the theoretical prediction. The baseline is the only treatment
where bidders are bidding above the theory, and it is notably the only treatment
where the bidders are not in a limited liability environment. Given these di¤er-
ences, the averages and regression lines presented in gure 1 show a large degree
of conformity to the theoretical prediction, but there is a substantial amount of
variance.
Treatment Observed Bid Theoretical Prediction Di¤erence
Full Liability - Baseline 35.60 33.96 1.64
Resale Liability 37.46 38.42 -0.96
5% Default Liability 38.93 41.36 -2.43
25% Default Liability 34.10 35.47 -1.37
Table 4: Average observed bids and theoretical predictions
In all of the limited liability treatments, bids are below the theoretical pre-
diction but given the range of possible realized values, the di¤erence between
the theoretical bid and the observed bid does not appear to be substantial. The
maximum di¤erence occurs in the 5% default liability, and the observed bid is
only approximately 6% less than the theoretical prediction. The resale liability
is a slightly more di¢ cult equilibrium bid for bidders to understand and imple-
ment, yet the di¤erence between the theoretical prediction and observed bid is
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minimal. This evidence, while promising, should be approached carefully. It is
clear from gure 1 that the variation in bids is substantial. This implies sub-
stantial individual heterogeneity in bids, likely inuenced by factors such as an
individuals level of strategic thinking and risk attitudes. The most promising
implication is that bids are increasing within limited liability environments.
Table 5 presents the bid regression results, using random e¤ects at the in-
dividual level.11 The predicted bid under full liability is bFL = Lb + 10: The
full liability specication gives a higher intercept of 13.55, which is signicantly
di¤erent from the predicted value of 10. Likewise, the coe¢ cient on the lower
bound is found to be signicantly di¤erent from predicted value of 1. The pre-
dicted bid under resale liability is bRL = Lb + 15: Under the resale limited
liability scheme, the constant is found to be not signicantly di¤erent from the
predicted constant of 15, but the prediction on the lower bound does not hold.
The 5% default rule had a predicted bid function of b5% = :952Lb + 19:04: In
this model, the constant is found to be signicantly di¤erent from the predic-
tion at the 10% level, but the coe¢ cient on the lower bound is not signicantly
di¤erent from the prediction. The last liability case, 25% default, involves the
cuto¤ value in the bid function. For lower bounds below the cuto¤ value of 30,
the predicted bid function is b25% = :8Lb+16: The predicted bid function above
the cuto¤ is equivalent to the full liability bid b25% = Lb + 10. To test these
theoretical predictions, a dummy variable was created for lower bounds greater
than the cuto¤. This is then interacted with the lower bound to formulate ob-
served bids for testing against the theoretical predictions. All of the observed
coe¢ cients are signicantly di¤erent from the predictions.
Full Liability Resale 5% Default 25% Default
Bid Estimate p-value Estimate p-value Estimate p-value Estimate p-value
Constant 13:55
(0:983)
< 0:001 16:64
(1:649)
0:319 15:74
(1:974)
0:094 10:61
(1:705)
0:002
Lower Bound (Lb) 0:92
(0:024)
< 0:001 0:89
(0:033)
< 0:001 0:99
(0:040)
0:346 1:02
(0:047)
< 0:001
Value > 30 7:73
(4:019)
0:031
Value > 30 * Lb  0:23
(0:109)
0:036
R2 (overall) 0:65 0:63 0:65 0:71
Table 5: Panel random e¤ects for bidding in all Treatments for the last 10
periods. Standard errors are in parentheses. The reported p-value represents
the equality test of the coe¢ cient to the theoretical prediction
The models that perform least well are the full liability and high default
cost (25%) limited liability. The point predictions of the model do not explicitly
hold, but this is not a surprise given the substantial heterogeneity observed in
the gures. The theory also predicts directional shifts for bids based on the
liability treatment. To test the directional consistencies of the theory and to
11Clustering standard errors by subject.
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analyze the heterogeneity in bidding behavior in greater depth, table 6 presents
the regression results, using random e¤ects at the individual level.
Model 1 Model 2 Model 3 Model 4
Bid Estimate p-value Estimate p-value Estimate p-value Estimate p-value
Constant 13.206 <0.001 15.014 <0.001 14.959 <0.001 12.810 <0.001
Lower Bound (Lb) 0.935 <0.001 0.935 <0.001 0.935 <0.001 0.933 <0.001
# Safe -0.344 0.427 -0.334 0.436 0.085 0.860
Resale Liability 1.431 0.147 1.428 0.148 2.894 0.081 5.962 0.157
Lb x Resale -0.063 0.184 -0.056 0.200
Safe x Resale -0.620 0.275
5% Default Liability 3.263 0.001 3.261 0.001 2.560 0.089 2.625 0.445
Lb x 5% Default 0.030 0.466 0.032 0.434
Safe x 5% Default -0.022 0.974
25% Default Liability 0.493 0.658 0.499 0.653 -0.251 0.863 9.902 0.001
Lb x 25% Default 0.032 0.379 0.040 0.268
Safe x 25% Default -1.914 <0.001
Table 6: Panel random e¤ects for bidding in all Treatments (Last 10 Periods)
In all model specications, the # safe variable represents the result from
the Holt & Laury (2002) test of risk preferences. The HL procedure presents
each subject with 10 lottery choices. Within each of the ten lottery choices, one
option is considered the safe option while the second option is considered the
risky option. Of the ten choices, the variable used within the regression analysis
above indicates the number of times the safe option was chosen.
The rst theoretical claim stated that bidding behavior should be higher in
the market-based resale limited liability environment than in the full liability
environment. The direction of this claim is conrmed by the positive coe¢ cients
on resale liability, however it is only moderately signicant in Model 3.
Result 1: The addition of the market-based limited liability through a sec-
ondary resale market increases bids above what is observed in a full-liability, no
resale environment, but not by as much as theory would predict.
The rst behavioral claim recognized that a secondary resale market creates
limited liability, but it also creates an environment for speculation. It appears
from gure 1 and the regression bidding results that there is some evidence for
speculation, especially in the lower range of lower bound draws. However, the
fact that the intercept shift is lower than what would be expected theoretically
makes it less likely that bidders are learning to speculate, but more evidence
is needed to di¤erentiate speculation from higher bidding because of limited
liability.
The second theoretical claim stated that statutory limited liability would
lead to more aggressive bidding, for the subset of values that lie below the
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cuto¤ value, vc, than what would result if bidders were not allowed to resell
under full liability. For values above the cuto¤ value, the bids under statutory
limited liability and full liability are equivalent. In this particular environment,
due to the range of values chosen, the cuto¤ value is not binding under the 5%
default cost rule. Therefore, we should expect all bids, regardless of the value
be more aggressive than the full liability treatment.
Under the 25% default cost rule, the cuto¤ value is 30. When a bidder has
a fundamental value of 30 or higher, the bids are theoretically equivalent under
the 25% default cost and full liability rules. The 5% default cost should have
more aggressive bidding, across all values, than the 25% rule. Examining the
results for the 5% default rule, it is evident that bidders are responding to the
strong limited liability incentives. Across three of the four model specications,
the coe¢ cients associated with this default rule are positive and signicant.
Result 2: Under a statutory default option, where the default cost is low,
bidders are bidding more aggressively than in the full-liability treatment, but not
by as much as theory would predict.
Under high default costs, the evidence is mixed. The coe¢ cients on the 25%
default rule are positive in three of the four model specications, as predicted,
but the results are not robust across model specications. In particular, it
appears that the heterogeneity of risk attitudes across bidders determines how
bidders respond to the 25% default rule, more so than in the other treatments.
Model 4 examines risk attitudes interacted with the treatments. In the 25%
default treatment, bidders who are more risk averse are bidding signicantly
less than bidders who are more risk tolerant.
Result 3: Under a statutory default option, where the default cost is high,
bidders are NOT bidding more aggressively than in the full-liability treatment.
Result 3 rejects the hypothesis regarding statutory default for high penalty
default rates. The theory was based on a risk neutral prediction, and the het-
erogeneity in risk attitudes is driving this result. Bidding is higher in all of the
limited liability treatments, but the negative interaction of risk aversion across
treatments indicates that risk averse individuals do not bid as aggressively un-
der limited liability as others who are not as risk averse. While this e¤ect exists
in all treatments, it is only signicant in the 25% default penalty environment.
Bidding higher occurs because of limited liability. Under statutory liability
rules, the default option exists. If bidders are bidding higher, the probability of
default is increasing. Table 7 examines the observed and predicted frequency of
default by treatment for the statutory limited liability cases where default is an
option.
Default in the statutory penalty cases was automatic. The cost of default
was compared to the losses from the auction and if the former was less, the
default option was exercised. The frequency of default is observed to be the
highest under the 5% default rule, as would be expected due to the low default
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cost and corresponding higher bids. In relative terms, the default percentage
should be lower when the cost is higher, and this holds for the 25% default rule.
The observed frequency of default is lower than predicted which implies that
bidders are not bidding as high as predicted to take full advantage of the limited
liability a¤orded by these rules.
Treatment Outcome Observed Predicted
Default
5% Penalty
0:13
(41)
0:16
(51)
Default
25% Penalty
0:04
(12)
0:06
(18)
Resale 0:15
(47)
0:09
(28)
Table 7: Observed and Predicted frequency of default and resale outcomes, by
treatment. (Actual default/resale numbers in parenthesis).
The frequency of resale outcomes, observed and predicted, from the market-
based limited liability treatment is also examined in table 7. The opportunity
to resell was automatic. The losing bidder was automatically sold to at a price
equal to their realized value if it was higher than the realized value of the
winning bidder. Contrary to the default predictions where observed frequencies
fall short of predictions, the observed frequency of resale outcomes is greater
than the prediction. The predicted frequency of resale was based on a model
that only considered the liability aspects of resale. Behaviorally, we know that
speculation is something that bidders may engage in when resale is possible,
and the higher observed frequency is evidence of that behavior.
4.2 Revenue and e¢ ciency
The possibility of default clearly impacts the revenue collected by the auction-
eer. In a second price auction without a default option, the revenue earned by
the seller is equal to the second highest bid. The analysis of this paper assumes
two bidders, so the revenue equates to the lowest bid placed in the auction in
both the resale and full liability treatments. In the default treatments, the seller
would earn 5% or 25% of the second highest bid in the event of default. Table
8 examines the average revenue, by treatment, achieved in the experimental
auctions. It also examines the theoretical prediction for revenue. The predicted
revenue is obtained by using the actual values bidders experienced in the ex-
periment and the theoretical bid functions to generate the revenue that would
have been observed had the subjects followed the theoretical bid functions.
The highest revenue occurred in the market-based resale treatment. This
result matches the theoretical predicted rank. Higher bidding leads to higher
revenue under the resale treatment, because default is not allowed. Under the
statutory liability treatments, bidding was only observed to be more aggressive
in the low default penalty case of 5%. In general, when default is allowed and the
spread between the lower bounds is not substantial, revenue drops. Despite the
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aggressive bidding under a low default penalty, the low penalty and frequency
of default led to the lowest revenue in this treatment.
These theoretical predictions indicate that the lowest revenues should occur
under full liability and the 5% default treatment, and the revenue from these two
treatments should di¤er by less than 1%. Observationally, we see that revenue
under full liability exceeds that of the low default cost treatment by approxi-
mately 36%. Instead of resulting in the second lowest revenue, full liability earns
the second highest revenue. Theoretically, the second highest revenue should
have occurred under the higher default penalty of 25%. Both statutory liability
treatments earned less than the market-based resale liability and full liability
cases. Interestingly, in all limited liability treatments the average observed rev-
enue was less than what was predicted, and the revenue under full liability is
higher than predicted.
Treatment Average Net Revenue Theoretical Prediction
Full Liability 26:03
(13:48)
25:76
(11:33)
Resale 28:31
(12:81)
29:79
(11:28)
5% Default 19:08
(15:26)
25:69
(15:29)
25% Default 23:01
(14:75)
27:45
(10:97)
Table 8: Revenue results by treatment (Standard Deviation)
To compare revenue to the theoretical prediction, Table 9 presents the re-
gression results of theoretical predictions on the observed revenue, using random
e¤ects at the average group level.12
Full Liability Resale 5% Default 25% Default
Observed Revenue Estimate p-value Estimate p-value Estimate p-value Estimate p-value
Constant 3:16
(1:331)
0:017 1:53
(2:490)
0:536  6:87
(7:130)
0:334  13:03
(3:325)
< 0:001
Theory Revenue 0:88
(0:039)
0:004 0:89
(0:073)
0:169 0:93
(0:254)
0:791 1:30
(0:085)
< 0:001
R2 (overall) 0:72 0:81 0:35 0:75
Table 9: Panel random e¤ects for bidding in all Treatments for the last 10
periods. Standard errors are in parentheses. The reported p-value represents
the equality test of the coe¢ cient to the theoretical prediction
If the theoretical model predicts revenue accurately, we should see a coe¢ -
cient of 1 on Theory Revenue with a zero constant. In the resale treatment and
the 5% default treatment, the constant is positive and not signicantly di¤er-
ent from zero, and the coe¢ cient on theory revenue is not signicantly di¤erent
12Each group of 16 bidders was divided into groups 8. The group of 8 is the level that the
averages are formulated for.
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from 1. These models were fairly accurate in predicting revenue. The remaining
full liability and 25% default treatments do not predict as accurately. In both
of these cases, the coe¢ cient for theory revenue is signicantly di¤erent from 1,
and the constant is signicantly di¤erent from zero.
Revenue results are examined in more depth in Table 10 to determine if the
directional predictions of the theory hold with signicance. These regression
results use random e¤ects at the group level. The variable V(1) represents the
highest lower bound of the two bidders, while V(2) is the second highest lower
bound.
Model 1
(Last 10 periods)
Model 2
(Last 10 periods)
Revenue Estimate p-value Estimate p-value
Constant 10.126 <0.001 9.921 <0.001
V(1) 0.127 <0.001 0.131 0.009
V(2) 0.749 <0.001 0.754 <0.001
Resale Liability 2.837 <0.001 2.918 0.001
5% Default Liability -6.445 <0.001 -4.821 <0.001
25% Default Liability -2.592 0.055 -2.016 0.023
Bidder Default -6.470 <0.001
Table 10: Panel random e¤ects for revenue
In both models, the average revenue results presented in Table 10 are con-
rmed by the coe¢ cients on each treatment. The resale liability treatment
results in higher revenue, represented by a positive signicant intercept shift in
models 1 and 2. The lowest revenue achieved was in the 5% default treatment,
and this is conrmed by the signicant negative intercept shifts, across both
models. The 25% default rule also shows lower revenue than what occurs in
the full liability treatment, but the e¤ect is not as strong as the 5% default
rule. For both statutory cases, there is a negative intercept shift in both models
indicating that if the default option exists and it is exercised, revenue will de-
crease. Model 2 includes the binary variable for bidder default, clearly showing
the impact it has on revenue. The second highest lower bound, V(2); has the
greatest impact on revenue which is expected in a second price auction where
the losing bidders bid sets the auction price. These regression results lead to
two key revenue ndings.
Result 3: The addition of the secondary resale market increases revenue
above what is observed in a full-liability, no resale environment, or a similar
environment where default is allowed.
Result 4: Under a statutory default option, revenue is lower than what is
observed under full-liability or a market-based resale environment.
The e¢ ciency generated by the initial auction allocation is another way of
characterizing outcomes from the auctions. E¢ ciency is generally measured as
23
the value generated by the auction divided by the maximum value the auction
could have achieved, VV  . The uncertainty in this paper creates two interesting
forms of e¢ ciency. The rst form, pre-lottery e¢ ciency, results from the lower
bounds of the lottery. Pre-lottery e¢ ciency is dened as the lower bound of
the winner of the auction divided by the maximum lower bound of the two
bidders. The second form of e¢ ciency, post-lottery e¢ ciency, is calculated after
the uncertainty of the lottery is resolved. Post-lottery e¢ ciency is dened as
the realized value of the winner divided by the maximum realized value of the
two bidders in the bidding group.
In the resale treatment, the secondary market makes overall e¢ ciency always
equal to 1 as the nal allocation in resale always goes to the bidder with the
highest realized value. The e¢ ciency forms considered above are the interim
forms of e¢ ciency before resale occurs. In statutory default treatments, the
interim e¢ ciency is calculated prior to the default decision. If default occurs,
the item is given back to the auctioneer. The e¢ ciency form above is again the
interim e¢ ciency, prior to the default decision.
Examining the e¢ ciency of the initial auction is particularly signicant in
the case where there is a resale opportunity. If speculation is observed, then we
should expect e¢ ciency rates to decline. The standard e¢ ciency of an ascending
auction without uncertainty, or a resale opportunity, obtained from previous
experimental results has resulted in high e¢ ciency rates.13
The e¢ ciency results of the current experiment are presented in Table 11,
by treatment. Pre-lottery e¢ ciency refers to the e¢ ciency rate prior to the
resolution of uncertainty of the lottery, while post-lottery e¢ ciency is the interim
e¢ ciency rate following the resolution of the lottery but keeping the allocation
from the auction. Post-lottery e¢ ciency with default examines the e¢ ciency
of the nal allocation, after the default option has been exercised. If a bidder
defaults, the item is returned to the seller and e¢ ciency is zero. The nal
allocation for the resale case is not examined, because by construction, this
e¢ ciency rate is always equal to 1, which is full e¢ ciency.
Examining pre-lottery e¢ ciency rst, the rates across the full liability, re-
sale and 5% default treatments are very similar, and relatively close to 1. It
appears as if the addition of resale does not signicantly lower overall e¢ ciency
compared to other treatments. The lowest pre-lottery e¢ ciency resulted from
the 25% default treatment. To test the validity of these numbers from a random
occurrence, an additional e¢ ciency measure was created from the average of the
two values, for both pre-lottery and post-lottery values, divided by the maximum
value. These measures hovered around .75 for pre-lottery e¢ ciency, indicating
that the observed e¢ ciency rates are a 25% improvement over random. For
post-lottery e¢ ciency, the average random measure was approximately .78, so
the observed e¢ ciency rates are a 19% improvement over the random measure.
The post-lottery e¢ ciency rates are lower for all treatments, except 25%
default. This result is not surprising, given that the average spread between
13High e¢ ciency is close to 1. See Coppinger et al.(1980) for an example of experimental
results of an ascending auction without resale. The second price clock auction is a similar
format to the ascending auction, except that bids of the participants remained sealed.
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the lower bounds of both bidders for all treatments was 16.4, which is less
than 20. It is interesting to note that post-lottery e¢ ciency rose, by a small
amount in the 25% default treatment. High pre-lottery e¢ ciency indicates that
the bidder with the highest lower bound is winning the auction. This was
anticipated theoretically. The lower pre-lottery e¢ ciency for the 25% default
treatment indicates that heterogeneity in response to the higher default cost led
to bidders with a higher lower bound not necessarily winning the auction. The
post-lottery e¢ ciency increases slightly over the pre-lottery e¢ ciency because
of this heterogeneity and the fact that the 25% default treatment had the lowest
spread average between the lower bounds of 15.6.
Treatment Pre-Lottery E¢ ciency Post-Lottery E¢ ciency Post-Lottery E¢ ciency with Default
Full Liability 0.946 0.918 -
Resale 0.940 0.926 -
5% Default 0.943 0.935 0.725
25% Default 0.907 0.918 0.882
Table 11: E¢ ciency results by treatment
The high pre-lottery e¢ ciency rate for the resale treatment is surprising,
contrasted with the results in Saral (2009). Saral found strong ine¢ ciency in
auctions where a secondary market existed. This ine¢ ciency resulted from bid-
ders with low values speculating to win and resell to high value bidders who
were shading their bids substantially because of the resale market. Saral found
that the highest e¢ ciency rate with resale was approximately .86, which is much
lower than the pre-lottery e¢ ciency rate of .94 observed in these auctions. The
resale treatment e¢ ciency results suggest that while a few bidders might be
speculating, the majority of high bids are resulting from bidders taking advan-
tage of the limited liability o¤ered by a secondary market. The second price
auction used a clock format, so the higher e¢ ciency rates correspond to the
high rates observed in ascending clock auctions without value uncertainty.
Value uncertainty is one component leading to slightly lowered e¢ ciency
rates, but it is also likely given the bidding data presented above, that risk
heterogeneity is a factor in the lowered e¢ ciency rates. Bidders with lower
risk tolerance are bidding lower, evidenced with signicance in the 25% default
treatment. In the event that the two competing bidders had close lower bounds,
it is highly likely that a risk averse bidder with a higher low bound placed a bid
lower than their less risk averse opponent. This would lead to the result that the
25% default cost treatment had the lowest e¢ ciency rates. In general, however,
there are not signicant di¤erences in interim e¢ ciency rates, by treatment.
The last e¢ ciency rate examined is post-lottery e¢ ciency with the default
decision factored in. E¢ ciency in the 5% default treatment fell by 0.21 as these
bidders exercised the default option once the uncertainty was resolved. This
rate is notable in that it is actually lower than the random measure by approx-
imately 7%. Default was not exercised as often in the 25% default treatment,
so while the post-lottery e¢ ciency rate with default does fall, it is only lower
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by approximately 0.04.
5 Conclusion
This paper examines the impact of various liability settings in a second price
clock auction environment to determine how liability rules inuence the bidding
behavior in the auction. Full liability rules were theoretically and experimentally
contrasted against market-based limited liability induced through resale and
statutory limited liability. It was predicted theoretically that bids would be
more aggressive under all limited liability treatments than under full liability.
The rst fundamental experimental result is that bidding behavior becomes
more aggressive under market-based limited liability and low statutory default
penalties, but not by as much as theory would predict for a risk neutral bidder.
Second, under statutory liability with a higher cost of default, bidders did not
choose to bid more aggressively than under full liability, despite theoretical
predictions that bids should be higher.
This paper also empirically addressed risk attitudes towards liability. With
a very low default cost, all bidders chose to bid more aggressively, and risk
attitudes did not factor signicantly into the response to decreased liability.
Similarly, when resale was allowed, risk attitudes did not factor substantially
into this market-based limited liability environment. Under a secondary resale
opportunity, it was observed that a majority of the bids were not speculative in
nature. This is perhaps one explanation as to why risk attitudes are not more
prevalent in this environment. Speculation is a risky endeavor as a speculating
bidder is choosing to bid higher than their maximum possible value. If more
speculation had been observed, then subjects with a higher risk tolerance would
have likely appeared signicant.
It is interesting to note that speculation is not observed as often was observed
in Saral (2009). This is likely due to the added complexity of value uncertainty
in two ways. First, bidders not only have to cognitively handle their expected
value, but if they wanted to speculate, they must also account for the uncertainty
of the other bidders values. Second, it is also likely the result of the number of
bidders participating. This environment only had two bidders, so the probability
that the opposing bidder had a higher lower bound is less than it would be with
more bidders. Given the lack of speculation, what this paper does show is that
bidders are able to internalize the resale market as limited liability, shown by
bids that are higher than under the corresponding full liability environment
without resale.
When designing an auction the seller must carefully consider the statutory
default conditions prior to holding the auction. It has been shown that a low
default penalty does lead to more aggressive bidding, but this leads to default
and actually lowers revenue. Under a higher default penalty, bidders are less
likely to consider default as a viable option, and therefore bid as if default does
not exist. To maximize revenue, these results suggest that an auctioneer would
be best o¤ enforcing full liability or a high statutory default option.
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Market-based limited liability through resale, under an auction with no de-
fault, leads to more aggressive bidding that benets an auction seller. The
resale examined in this paper was strictly inter-bidder.14 This is a narrow view
of post-auction resale. It is highly likely, in a eld setting, that potential buyers
exist that did not know of or could not participate in the auction. These buyers
could increase the probability that the winner bidder could resell, not only to
mitigate losses, but to potentially make a prot. All of these factors highlight
the positive benet for the initial seller of resale on revenue.
In general, this paper examines how decisions with uncertainty are inuenced
by di¤erent liability conditions. The extensions of which go beyond the auction
environment alone. Decisions may involve more risk as the loss potential is
diminished through limited liability, but this is dependent on the risk attitudes
of the subjects.
One additional topic not addressed by this paper, that could possible alter
behavioral outcomes, is the stigma attached to default. Individuals may vary
considerably in their perceptions of default. The experimental design considered
in this paper made the default choice automatic if the losses from the auction
exceeded the default payment. Behaviorally, we would expect that individuals
have di¤ering attitudes regarding default, and this may in turn substantially
impact the default rates observed - and the bids leading to default. This would
be an interesting idea for future research.
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7 Appendix
7.1 Bid function under Full Liability
The second price auction problem is dened as follows under the full liabil-
ity case for bidder i; assuming that the bid function, b(v), is monotonic and
di¤erentiable:
max
r
Ui(vi; r) =
R r
0
[Pr(vi = xi)  (vi   bj(t)) + Pr(vi = xi + y)  (vi + y   bj(t))] dF (t)
Understanding that Pr(vi = xi) = 12 and Pr(vi = xi + y) =
1
2 ; the above
simplies to:
max
r
Ui(vi; r) =
R r
0

1
2 (vi   bj(t)) + 12 (vi + y   bj(t))

dF (t)
Again, repeating the equilibrium condition as @(Ui(vi;r))@r jr=vi = 0:
Taking the derivative leads to:
1
2 (v   b(r)) + 12 (v + y   b(r))
 @F (r)
@r = 0:
In equilibrium, r = v; giving the symmetric, increasing bid solution:
bFL(v) = v +
1
2y
7.2 Bid function under Resale
The second price auction problem is dened as follows under the full liabil-
ity case for bidder i; assuming that the bid function, b(v), is monotonic and
di¤erentiable:
max
r
Ui(vi; r) =
Z r y
0
[Pr(vi = xi)  (vi   bj(t)) + Pr(vi = xi + y)  (vi + y   bj(t))] dF (t) +Z r
r y
[Pr(vi = xi)fPr(vj = xj)  (vi   bj(t)) + Pr(vj = xj + y)  (t+ y   bj(t))g+
Pr(vi = xi + y)fvi + y   bj(t)g]dF (t) +
Z 1
r
0  d[1  F (t)]
Understanding that Pr(vi = xi) = 12 and Pr(vi = xi + y) =
1
2 ; the above
simplies to:
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max
r
Ui(vi; r) =
Z r y
0

1
2
(vi   bj(t)) + 1
2
(vi + y   bj(t))

dF (t) +Z r
r y

1
4
(vi   bj(t)) + 1
4
(t+ y   bj(t)) + 1
2
(vi + y   bj(t)

dF (t)
+
Z 1
r
0  d[1  F (t)]
Again, repeating the equilibrium condition as @(Ui(vi;r))@r jr=vi = 0:
Taking the derivative leads to:

1
2
(v   b(r   y)) + 1
2
(v + y   b(r   y))

dF (r)
dr
+
1
4
(v   b(r)) + 1
4
(r + y   b(r)) + 1
2
(v + y   b(r)

dF (r)
dr
 
1
4
(v   b(r   y)) + 1
4
(r + y   b(r)) + 1
2
(v + y   b(r)

dF (r   y)
dr
= 0
In equilibrium, r = v; giving the symmetric, increasing bid solution:
bRL(v) = v +
3
4y
7.3 Bid function under Statutory Limited Liability
For the second price auction with stated rules, the symmetric statutory liability
(SL) bidding solution can be shown to be:
bSL(vi) =

1
1+ (v + y) if v  vc
v + 12y if v > vc
The cuto¤ value, vc, is dened by equating the asserted bid functions.
1
1+ (vc + y) = vc +
1
2y
=) vc = y2 ( 1  )
Proof. Default will not be exercised as long as the payo¤ from not defaulting
is greater than the payo¤ from defaulting, vi   bj >  bj . This implies that
default not occur as long as vi1  > bj : In the rst region, where v  vc; it is
asserted that the bid function is b = 11+ (v + y). The cuto¤ for default and
the bid function combined give us that a bidder will not default as long as
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vi
1  >
1
1+ (vj+y): Bidder i will default when the reverse holds and their value,
vi = xi; is the low draw. The above inequality, vi1  >
1
1+ (vj + y);gives us the
interior limits of integration for the following maximization problem for bidder
i in a second price auction.
max
r
Ui(vi; r; ) =
Z ( 1+1  )r y
0
[Pr(vi = xi)  (vi   bj(t)) + Pr(vi = xi + y)  (vi + y   bj(t))] dF (t) +Z r
( 1+1  )r y
[Pr(vi = xi)  ( bj(t)) + Pr(vi = xi + y)  (vi + y   bj(t))] dF (t)
Taking the derivative of the above maximization problem, and substituting
in the basic lottery probabilities gives us the following:h
1
2 (vi   bj(( 1+1  )r   y) + 12 (vi + y   bj(( 1+1  )r   y)
i
dF (( 1+1  )r y)
dr +
1
2 ( bj(r)) + 12 (vi + y   bj(r))
 dF (r)
dr  h
1
2 ( bj(( 1+1  )r   y) + 12 (vi + y   bj(( 1+1  )r   y)
i
dF (( 1+1  )r y)
dr = 0 (i)
The proposed bid function evaluated at the limits of integration
bj((
1+
1  )r   y) = 11 r
bj(r) =
1
1+ (r + y) (ii)
Combining (i) and (ii); and simplifying results in the following:
v = r; which is the equilibrium condition.
For the region where v > vc =
y
2 (
1 
 ); a bidder would never default. First I
will show that under either of the proposed bid functions, a bidder would never
default for values greater than or equal to vc: A bidder never defaults whenever
vi   bj >  bj . Assume the reverse, that a bidder would default when the
value is given by the cuto¤ v = y2 (
1 
 ). For a bidder to default, it must be the
case that vi   bj <  bj . Utilizing the default condition and the bid function,
b = 11+ (v+y); we can show that a bidder would never default by contradiction.
v   b <  b
y
2 (
1 
 ) < (1  )b
y
2 < b = (
1
1+ )(v + y)
y
2 < (
1
1+ )(
y
2 (
1 
 ) + y)
1 +  < ; a contradiction.
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The same can be shown for the bid function, b = v + 12y:
It is shown that default does not exist in the regions where v > vc; so it
remains to solve for the equilibrium bid function in this region. Dene the second
price auction problem as follows for bidder i;assuming that the bid function,
b(v), is monotonic and di¤erentiable in this region:
max
r
Ui(vi; r) =
R r
y
2 (
1 
 )
[Pr(vi = xi)  (vi   bj(t)) + Pr(vi = xi + y)  (vi + y   bj(t))] dF (t)
Understanding that Pr(vi = xi) = 12 and Pr(vi = xi + y) =
1
2 ; the above
simplies to:
max
r
Ui(vi; r) =
R r
y
2 (
1 
 )

1
2 (vi   bj(t)) + 12 (vi + y   bj(t))

dF (t)
Again, repeating the equilibrium condition as @(Ui(vi;r))@r jr=vi = 0:
Taking the derivative leads to:

1
2 (v   b(r)) + 12 (v + y   b(r))
 @F (r)
@r  

1
2 (v   b(y2 ( 1  ))) + 12 (v + y   b(y2 ( 1  )))
 @F ( y2 ( 1  ))
@r =
0:
In equilibrium, r = v; giving the symmetric, increasing bid solution:
bSL(v) = v +
1
2y
7.4 Limiting Case of Statutory Limited Liability
The payo¤ resulting to the winning bidder in this second price auction set-up
is dened as follows, under statutory default penalty rule for bidder i:
Ui(vi; bj ; ) =
1
2 max fvi   bj;   bjg+ 12 max fvi + y   bj;   bjg
If a bidder faces a default penalty  = 1; the bidder is fully liable for bid
payment. The above payo¤ function reduces to the following under this rule:
Ui(vi; bj ; ) =
1
2 max fvi   bj;   bjg+ 12 max fvi + y   bj;   bjg
In the case that the realized value is the upper bound, the payo¤ is:
max fvi + y   bj;   bjg = vi + y   bj; because vi + y > 0 by denition.
This implies that a bidder would never choose to default and accept a pay-
ment of  bj :
In the case that the realized value is the lower bound, the payo¤ is:
max fvi   bj;   bjg = vi   bj; if vi > 0
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When vi = 0;
vi  bj =  bj , so there is no maximum and the bidder is indi¤erent between
default and not defaulting.
It is assumed that the bidder will choose not to default, and accept the payo¤
of vi   bj :
The above analysis shows that in the limit, as ! 1; the statutory default
payo¤ function reduces to that of full liability, and the second price auction
problem is therefore dened as follows:
max
r
Ui(vi; r) =
R r
0
[Pr(vi = xi)  (vi   bj(t)) + Pr(vi = xi + y)  (vi + y   bj(t))] dF (t)
Which results in the asserted bid function:
bSL;=1(v) = v +
1
2y
7.5 Revenue comparisons
7.5.1 Resale vs. Full Liability
The bid functions under full liability and resale liability were shown to be
bFL(vi) = vi +
1
2y b

RL(v) = v +
3
4y
Utilizing order statistics for the uniform distribution on the support [0; 1],
the prediction that revenue is higher under resale liability follows directly.
EFL[revenue] = EFL[b

FL(VN 1)] =
1
3+
1
2y < ERL[revenue] = ERL[b

RL(VN 1)] =
1
3 +
3
4y
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